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Winship: Policing Compensatory Relief in Agency Settlements

POLICING COMPENSATORY RELIEF IN AGENCY
SETTLEMENTS
Verity Winship*
Administrative agencies sometimes act as "public class counsel": they
seek money that they then distribute to victims. The Securities and
Exchange Commission,for instance, often creates Fair Funds through
which it distributes money collected as fines and disgorgement to
injured investors. This Essay examines the consequences of this rolefor
judicial review of agency settlements and other protections of absent
group members. It argues that such protections should be triggered
when the rights of absent "class members" to their day in court are
compromised This may happen when the agency 's action precludes
related actions or otherwise limits potential recovery elsewhere. The
Essay resists the wholesale import of private litigation mechanisms to
the agency context, instead identifying the situations in which
protections developed in the context of private aggregate litigation
should apply to the public agency context.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies sometimes settle with companies for millions
of dollars in civil money penalties. Where does that money go? The
answer increasingly is that the agency directs the money to victims of
the wrong. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
particular has used its power to create "Fair Funds" to distribute
penalties and disgorgement to injured investors.' When an agency seeks
compensatory relief, it acts as what I have called elsewhere "public class
* Associate Professor of Law, Richard W. & Marie L. Corman Scholar, College of Law,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I appreciate the helpful conversations and comments on
drafts from Bob Lawless and Adam Zimmerman, and the research assistance of Sierra Hennings. I am
also grateful to Barbara Black and the participants in the Corporate Law Center symposium at the
University of Cincinnati Law School, to which this Essay contributes. Errors and omissions are my
own.
1. Verity Winship, FairFunds and the SEC's Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FL. L.
REv. 1103 (2008) [hereinafter Winship, Fair Funds]; 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006) (the Fair Fund
Provision).
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counsel."2 Agencies and other public actors have increasingly used
money recovered as restitution, disgorgement, or even fines to
compensate victims, and a growing literature examines aggregate
actions bZ public class counsel in varied administrative and other public
contexts.
Focusing on the SEC's compensation of injured investors, this Essay
identifies some limits to the comparison between private and public
aggregate actions. It focuses on the effect of these actions on the basic
due process rights of absent group members. In the context of private
aggregate actions such as class actions and derivative suits, legislators
and judges have built an extensive apparatus to protect absent class
members, including judicial review of the adequacy of representation,
notice requirements, and more. This Essay argues that similar
protections should be triggered in public actions when the right of
absent represented parties to their day in court is compromised. This
may happen when, for instance, absent "members" are precluded from
bringing other related actions or when their potential recovery is limited
by the agency's action. One consequence of this concern with due
process rights is that judges and regulators should devote close attention
to the preclusive effects of consent decrees and to whether amounts
recovered in agency actions reduce amounts paid in related private
actions (the offset rules). When absent parties' rights are implicated in
this way, they should get additional protections. For instance, judicial
evaluation of whether a settlement or a distribution plan is fair,
adequate, and reasonable should more closely mirror the procedural
protections developed in the context of private litigation.
II. THE ANALOGY TO PRIVATE AGGREGATE ACTIONS

Agency actions in which the agency functions as public class counsel
resemble private aggregate actions for damages in two main ways.
First, the remedy is compensatory, at least in part. Second, most or all
of the group members who benefit from this relief are absent from the
2. Winship, Fair Funds, supra note 1, at 1107. See also Verity Winship, Public Agencies and
Investor Compensation: Examples from the SEC and CFTC, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 137, 139 (2009)
(contrasting the approaches of the SEC and CFTC to investor compensation).
3. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?,
63 Bus. LAW. 317 (2008) (examining the impact of Fair Funds on investor protection); Margaret H.
Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 486 (2012) (comparing parens patriae actions by state attorneys general with private class
actions); Urska Velikonja, Public Compensationfor PrivateHarm: Evidence From the SEC's FairFund
Distributions,67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (providing an empirical analysis of the SEC's use
of Fair Funds); Winship, Fair Funds, supra note 1; Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Distributing Justice] (proposing additional
procedural safeguards for compensatory agency settlements).
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action.
Compensatory relief traditionally was a remedy within the nearexclusive domain of private litigants. For a long time policymakers
were reluctant to have any administrative agency compensate particular
individuals or entities.4 Over time, however, compensatory relief has
become an available and widely accepted remedy. In the SEC context,
disgorgement and restitution were an early source of compensation. The
power of the courts to distribute this money was initially based on their
inherent remedial powers and was later codified.5 In recent years,
agency compensation in the securities context has grown in magnitude
in part because of the "Fair Fund" provision of Sarbanes-Oxley.' This
provision permits (but does not require) the SEC to direct civil money
penalties to injured investors rather than the U.S. Treasury.' The SEC
has repeatedly used this provision, and Congress incorporated a new
version into the Dodd-Frank securities statute.

This compensatory relief is usually obtained through a settlement
between the enforcement arm of the agency and the target of
investigation.' 0

The vast majority of SEC enforcement actions are

settled, often simultaneously with filing." Moreover, this practice is not
limited to the SEC; many lawsuits about public policy and institutional

4. As late as the 1970s, a commentator involved in the Administrative Conference's evaluation
of money penalties wrote that "[b]y definition, a civil money penalty does not serve a 'specific'
compensatory function of making whole an identifiable individual specifically injured by the offending
conduct," which was instead a job for private remedies. See Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and
Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by FederalAdministrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1435,
1456 n.135 (1979). Moreover, it took the SEC thirty years before it sought and received disgorgement
in an adjudicated action. Winship, FairFunds, supranote 1, at 1112.
5. SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(c) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002,
availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf.
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006) (the Fair Fund Provision); see generally Winship, Fair
Funds, supra note 1, at 1110-23 (reviewing the history of the SEC's role in compensating injured
investors).
7. See Winship, FairFunds, supra note 1, at 1110-23.
8. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-448R, SEC FAIR FUND COLLECTIONS AND
DISTRIBUTIONS (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0448r.pdf, Velikonja, supra note
3, at 3 (noting that the SEC has distributed $14.33 billion to investors since 2002).
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929B, 15 U.S.C. §7246(a)
(2010).
10. Although colloquially referred to as "settlements," agreements by agencies such as the SEC
or the DOJ are often in the form of a consent decree. Consent decrees are also sometimes called consent
judgments. Although the terms are distinguishable, this Essay adopts common usage and uses them
interchangeably.
11. See Jorge Baez et al., SEC Settlement Trends: 2H12 Update, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING
2
(Jan.
14,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nera.com/nerafiles/PUBSEC Trends Update_2HI2_0113_final.pdf (noting that the "vast majority" of SEC actions
settle).
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reform are resolved by consent decree.' 2 When a government agency is
one of the parties, settlement has been viewed as a way to maximize the
agency's limited resources,' as well as being considered beneficial for
many of the same reasons that the U.S. legal system endorses resolution
through agreement between private parties-efficient and amicable
settlement of disputes; increased "buy in" by the parties; or conservation
of judicial resources.' 4
Compensation is a component of many settlements, even those that
draw attention for other reasons.
For instance, proposed SEC
settlements with Bank of America and with Citigroup following the
recent financial crisis attracted attention because the trial judge took the
unusual step of rejecting the proposed settlements, provoking a debate
about whether the agency should require admissions of liability when
settling.' 5 A less publicized aspect of these agreements was that the
SEC designated fines and other monetary recoveries for compensation.
In the Bank of America matter, for instance, not only did the SEC
propose distribution of the $150 million penalty to injured investors
through a Fair Fund, but the court required its distribution as a condition
of settlement approval.' 6 The proposed Citigroup settlement included
$285 million in monetary relief, all of which could be allocated to a Fair
Fund for distribution to injured investors.17
The fact that both private and public actions can result in a

12. Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the
Fairnessof Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 888 (1984) ("Consent decrees first
became prominent in antitrust cases, and are now common in every variety of lawsuit over public
policy, including environmental cases, litigation over the rights of the institutionalized, school and
housing desegregation suits, and equal employment litigation." (footnotes omitted)).
13. Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on SEC
Settlements, 47 Bus. LAW. 1083 (1992); SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Because
of its limited resources, the SEC has traditionally entered into consent decrees to settle most of its
injunctive actions" and is "thus able to conserve its own and judicial resources . . . .").
14. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 19, 25; Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms:Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C.
L. REV. 291, 314, 328, 331 (1988).
15. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(rejecting proposed settlement); SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(rejecting proposed settlement); SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., Nos. I1-5227-cv (L), 11-5375cv(con), ll-5242-cv(xap) (2d Cir. June 4, 2014); Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of
Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement ofLaw, 82 U. CiN. L. REv. 504 (2013).
16. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (approving settlement).
17. The SEC noted in its description of the proposed terms that the SEC "may by motion
propose a plan to distribute the funds subject to the Court's approval" and that "[s]uch a plan may
provide that the funds be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(A) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002." See Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission in
Support of Proposed Settlement, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mlkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR), 2011 WL 4965843, at 14.
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compensatory remedy is not the only reason to compare them. In both
contexts, most or all of those allegedly wronged are absent from the
action. Private aggregate actions such as class actions and derivative
suits are representative. The class representatives and class counsel
speak for the absent members of the class. In a derivative suit, the
plaintiff sues on behalf of the corporation (speaking, in other words, for
all of the shareholders). In agency aggregate actions, those who are
harmed are not involved in the action and do not make any decisions
about how it proceeds. In the SEC context, the injured investors who
have a claim to distributions from the Fair Funds can be said to make up
the "class." The agency acts as the public class counsel, representing
those injured in addition to representing the public more generally. Both
of these sources of comparison-the compensatory remedy and the
representative nature of the suit-have prompted proposals to import
protections from the private context into the public. The basic due
process rationale for these protections, and the limits they suggest, is the
subject of the next part.
III. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF ABSENT GROUP MEMBERS

Parallels between aggregate actions by public actors and by private
litigants certainly exist and can be a rich source of inquiry into
fundamental issues about the function of agencies, lines between public
and private action, and commitments to due process. It is not selfevident, however, that the specific mechanisms of the two types of
action should be the same. Commentators have proposed increased
protections in certain public contexts, including aspects of judicial
review or participation rights such as formal intervention, a notice and
comment process, or other mechanisms.' 8 The suggestion here is simply
that these protections should be triggered when the interests of absent
group members are compromised by the public aggregate action and the
group members had no chance to represent themselves.' 9
Protection of absent group members is rooted in basic notions of due
process captured by the idea of the right to a day in court. The classic
case that articulated the due process rationale for protections in

18. See, e.g., Zimmerman, DistributingJustice, supra note 3, at 556 (proposing three categories
of procedural protection for agency aggregate actions: "multidistrict coordination, negotiated
rulemaking, and judicial hard look review").
19. Cf Lemos, supra note 3, at 546 (arguing that the parens patriaeaction should not preclude
private litigation because the state attorney general should be considered to represent the injured "class"
inadequately); Adam S. Zimmerman, The CorrectiveJustice State, J. OF TORT LAW (forthcoming 2014)
(including consideration of "the extent to which state action forecloses private litigation" as a reason to
relax certain safeguards in public compensatory actions).
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representative suits is Hansberry v. Lee.20 There the Supreme Court
pointed to "a failure of due process" in "cases where it cannot be said
that the procedure adopted fairly insures the protection of the interests of
absent parties who are to be bound by it." 21 More recently, the Supreme
Court has signaled how seriously it takes the basic premise that litigants
get a day in court by preventing lower courts from expanding the scope
of preclusion. In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Court rejected the idea of
"virtual representation," and declined to expand on existing categories
of nonparty preclusion. 22 Representative actions such as class actions or
derivative suits depart from this strong norm, but to compensate for this
departure, mechanisms are put in place to make sure the absent class
members are adequately represented so that adjudication of their rights
in their absence is fair.
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR AGENCY SETTLEMENTS
A consequence of this focus on protecting absent "class" members'
due process rights is that the court should determine the extent to which
the action by the agency, representing a group, precludes members of
that group from obtaining relief in a separate private suit. How this
approach might work can be illustrated by applying it to the existing
securities context. Because of current preclusion rules and offset
practices, the focus on preclusion as a main driver of protective
measures should reduce the need for additional protections for investors
who may recover from a Fair Fund.
First, settlement for monetary relief in an SEC action generally does
not preclude other actions by injured investors.23 In fact, private
securities class actions were filed in approximately 65% of the cases in
which the SEC created a Fair Fund.24 Under the analysis proposed here,
the fact that investors have another route to recovery reduces the need to
protect them within the SEC action.
Another way in which a public settlement potentially affects the
amounts available to the injured individuals or entities is if the amounts
are offset against those collected in other actions. 25 In the securities
enforcement context, no formal rule exists for determining whether the
20. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
21. Id. at 42.
22. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
23. Press Release, SEC, SEC Enforcement Director's Statement on Citigroup Case (Dec. 15,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-265.htm (noting that "[a]n SEC
settlement does not limit the ability of injured investors to pursue claims for additional relief').
24. See Velikonja, supra note 3, at 43.
25. See Winship, Fair Funds, supra note 1, at 1120-21 (detailing the consequences of different
offset rules).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss2/8

6

Winship: Policing Compensatory Relief in Agency Settlements

2013] POLICING COMPENSATORY RELIEF INAGENCY SETTLEMENTS

557

agency should allow offset against other actions based on the same facts.
Where this is the case, offset may be set forth in the terms of the consent
decree. At least in some instances, SEC settlements have prohibited
offset in related actions. A clause in the SEC's settlement with Bank of
America, for instance, provided that the settling company agreed not to
offset penalty amounts paid in an SEC action against any damages they
pay in a related private action 26:
To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, [the bank] agrees that
it shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory
damages in any Related Investor Action based on [the bank's] payment of
disgorgement in the Actions, argue that it is entitled to, nor shall it further
benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by
the amount of any part of the bank's] payment of a civil penalty in the
Actions ('Penalty Offset').
In the review framework suggested in this Essay, this limitation of
offset would reduce the need for protections akin to those necessary for
private aggregate actions. However, these policies change with time and
vary by agency or other public actor. Moreover, the question of offset
may not always be simple or binary, particularly to the extent that it also
arises in complex negotiated settlements among different private and
public entities. 28 This Essay's suggestion is merely that courts consider
the provisions for offset, whether in formal rules or in the agreements,
and that offsets, when present, should trigger additional care of absent
group members, including the type of analysis incorporated into judicial
review.
So far, the proposed comparison focuses on the effects of the public
action on rights in other, related proceedings, but sometimes the agency
action will be the only source of compensation. Some agency-only
actions are simply not good candidates for distribution, and do not give

26. See Final Consent Judgment as to Defendant Bank of America Corporation at 8, SEC v.
Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215
(JSR)), 2010 WL 430122 (providing that the agreement not to offset reaches any "private damages
action brought against [the bank] by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the
same facts as alleged in the [agency's] complaints. . . ").
27. Id. at II (further providing that, if a court in a private action based on the same facts grants
an offset, respondent has to notify the SEC's counsel and "pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the
United States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs"). See also Nevis Capital Mgmt.,
LLC, Investment Act Release No. 2214, 82 SEC Docket 523, 2004 WL 236571, at *9-11 (Feb. 9, 2004)
(noting that the respondent agreed not to "benefit from any offset or reduction of any investor's claim by
the amount of any Fair Fund distribution to such investor in this proceeding that is proportionally
attributable to the civil penalty paid by [the] Respondent" and to pay the Treasury or a Fair Fund any
offsets or reductions granted by a court in a private action).
28. See, e.g., Adam S. Zimmerman, Mass Settlement Rivalries, 82 U. CIN. L. REv. 381 (2013)
(describing the complex interactions among different actors in the mass settlement context).
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rise to the concerns discussed here. 29 At least one category, however,
raises the question of whether victims should have extra protections in
an agency action that is the sole source of compensation. In the SEC
context, for instance, actions for aiding and abetting securities violations
are limited to the SEC; there is no private right of action. 30 In these
circumstances, injured investors are identifiable and the compensatory
amounts are potentially high. The agency suit has no impact on the
rights of absent plaintiffs to sue that defendant based on the underlying
facts-the individuals have no private right of action-so agencyobtained compensation is potentially the only source of compensation.
Applying this Essay's proposed criteria, such agency suits would not
trigger additional protections, even for compensation and even when
these suits are the only cause of action. In a sense, this approach defers
to the initial legislative allocation of power between public actors and

private attorneys general, identifying participation rights where a private
right of action on the same facts exists.
Although concerned with the due process rights of the represented
individuals or entities, this standard may limit (rather than expand)
participation rights in practice. To the extent that recovery through the
agency process does not affect the rights of the represented individuals
to litigate the wrong, this approach would suggest that the individuals
are not entitled to extra protection or say in the amount or distribution of
funds. Underlying this approach is a normative judgment about the
appropriate balance of agency attention to the public interest as a whole
in comparison to the identifiable injured, compensable persons. In the
context of limited offset and preemption rules, it suggests that the
agency's main focus should be on the public.

Even if one disagrees

about this balance, the more narrow point holds that private protections
should not be unthinkingly imported into the public context. Providing
additional protections to those who may receive compensation, when
due process concerns are absent, should be justified by a separate reason
having to do with the public function of the settlement.
The argument here is that protections modeled on private actions are
called for when the agency action seeks compensatory relief and the
outcome compromises absent "class members' interests. The full class
action apparatus is beyond the scope of this Essay, but judicial review of
settlements provides an example of the type of protection that might be
29. Examples of actions that do not lend themselves to distribution include those where no clear
victims exist (such as for a books and records violation, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012)) or the
amounts are so low that distribution is impractical.
30. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177
(2008) (rejecting a private cause of action for aiding and abetting a § 10(b)(5) violation); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(e) (2006) (creating aiding and abetting liability in SEC actions but not in private actions).
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imported. Judges review both private and public aggregate settlements.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions,
requires courts to evaluate whether settlements are "fair, reasonable, and
adequate." 3' The Class Action Fairness Act makes this requirement
statutory in the more limited category of coupon settlements, requiring a
judicial hearing and written statement from the judge that the settlement
is "fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members" before approval.
Likewise, derivative suits brought in federal court and settled by consent
decree are subject to judicial review. 33
The standard of review for agency settlements is nominally similar.
Courts have often evaluated whether SEC settlements and distributions
are fair, reasonable, and adequate.34 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recently called for reviewing courts to determine
whether an agency settlement is "fair and reasonable" and that the
"'public interest would not be disserved'."3 s Beyond the SEC, judges
often have broad discretion to review other agencies' settlements for
fairness and accord with the public interest.3 6
Despite these surface similarities, one set of concerns is more

prominent in the private context. Although the factors courts identify
vary,3 7 courts and others have suggested that the main aim of settlement
review in the private context-as with other protective features of
formal aggregate litigation-is to protect the absent class members.3 8 In
31. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(2).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2005).
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(c) ("A derivative action may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
compromised only with the court's approval.").
34. See, e.g., SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("A Court
reviews such a settlement proposal not on the basis of what it might itself determine is the appropriate
penalty but on the basis of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate."). See also
KENNETH B. WINER & SAMUEL J. WINER, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT: COUNSELING AND DEFENSE

§

17.08 (2004) (noting that the relevant federal district court must approve any settlements of a civil
court case with the SEC).
35. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., Nos. 11-5227-cv (L), ll-5375-cv(con), 11-5242cv(xap) (2d Cir. June 4, 2014) (citations omitted) (vacating the opinion of Judge Rakoff rejecting the
SEC settlement).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Trucking Emp'rs, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
("[P]rior to approving a consent decree a court must satisfy itself of the settlement's 'overall fairness to
beneficiaries and consistency with the public interest."'); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The trial court in approving a settlement. . . need only
determine that the settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable and appropriate under the particular facts and
that there has been valid consent by the concerned parties."); 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2004) (detailing the
factors that courts shall consider when reviewing antitrust settlements to see whether they are "in the
public interest" as required by statute). But see Lemos, supra note 3 (noting the absence of judicial
review of settlements by state attorneys general).
37. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 10.1 (Judicial Supervision).
38. Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. Am., 148 F.3d 283, 316 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Rule 23(e) imposes on
the trial judge the duty of protecting absentees, which is executed by the court's assuring the settlement
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particular, in both the class action and derivative context, judges review
the adequacy of representation at various stages of the process,
addressing directly the question of whether the absent group members
had a say through their representative in court.3 9
Importing standards from the highly contested context of private
aggregate actions is clearly not a perfect fix. Standards for adequacy of
representation, for example, are both central and under-theorized, as is
the efficacy of judicial review in this context. 40 Nonetheless, this
proposal would shift the court's focus. Where the trial court rejected the
proposed settlement in the Bank of America and Citigroup cases, the
judge's review focused on the amount and whether admissions were
required. To the extent that the court discussed the compensatory
function, it was either to require the creation of a Fair Fund (Bank of
America)4 1 or to lament the fact that the SEC had said only that it "may"
direct the monetary relief to compensate injured investors (Citigroup).42
One way to implement this Essay's proposal is to add adequacy of
representation to the mix when the agency action implicates due process
rights. Review might thus involve more judicial scrutiny of inter-class
conflicts and conflicts of interest between the agency acting as public
class counsel and the class, drawing on the case law from private
aggregate actions.
V. CONCLUSION

The remedies available to public actors have converged with those of
private plaintiffs in recent years, as the power of government agencies to
obtain and distribute money to compensate individuals has increased
and as the agencies and other public actors have expanded their use of
these mechanisms. The SEC, for example, frequently acts as "public
class counsel", creating Fair Funds for distribution to injured investors.
For private aggregate actions, policymakers and judges have developed
an apparatus to protect the due process rights of absent group members.
In the public context, the need for protection is up for debate. Because
of the connection between these protections and the due process rights
of absent parties, this Essay suggests that protections should be triggered
represents adequate compensation for the release of the class claims." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy ofRepresentation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1151
(2009).
40. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 3, at 543 (noting that "adequate representation" is undertheorized).
41. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (approving settlement).
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when agency action leads to preclusion or impairment of the remedy
available to class members-when agency-recovered compensation
limits the absent group members' right to a day in court.
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